Changing civilian support for the Maoist conflict in India

Prolonged domestic political conflicts change over time. The Maoist conflict in India which began in the late 1960s is one such conflict. Over time, the ‘old’ Maoist conflict has become a ‘new’ Maoist conflict. Important changes have occurred both in the macro and micro processes of the conflict. Some of these changes include the strategic relocation of the Maoist bases, a shift in the class character of the conflict, the nature of civilian support, and the rebels' methods of operation. While in the 1960s, the conflict was involved in land redistribution with the aim of annihilating class enemies, the recent conflict focuses on caste identities. In addition, it is intrinsically linked with territorial control and local political competition. This has automatically led the Maoists to become involved with local criminal networks and also local business networks based. This involvement has led to financial resources for the conflict. Furthermore, it has forced the local population to become linked with the conflict. Studying these changes is important, especially for counterinsurgency policies.     

When the Going Gets Tough… Monitoring Missions and a Changing Conflict Environment in Sri Lanka, 2002–2008

This article analyzes how the conflict environment in which a civilian monitoring mission is deployed influences the monitors' assessment of the operation. It draws on unique empirical material from the experience of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), deployed to oversee a ceasefire agreement in Sri Lanka 2002–2008. With material from a survey and in-depth interviews, experiences of the monitors are analyzed and changes over time are traced in relation to the monitors' assessment of the mandate and organizational set-up of the mission. The study points to the difficulty of monitoring missions to address escalation during an ongoing peace process. Its function is dependent on the goodwill of the parties. In essence, monitoring missions have the potential to strengthen peace when there is momentum in favor of progress, but when relations between the parties turn sour and the conflict escalates a civilian monitoring mission basically loses its potential. During the final stages of the war, which saw a very large number of civilian casualties, the war-torn areas were closed to international observers. Moreover, international pressure for a short-term ceasefire to alleviate the humanitarian situation was dismissed by the Sri Lankan government, which also saw the backing of several important actors, not the least China.     

A1 Qaeda and the radical Islamic challenge to western strategy

The September 11 global crisis prompted by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon raises major questions concerning the nature and trajectory of terrorism in the post-Cold War global order. Hitherto, terrorism has been largely debated by analysts at the level of nation states. Terrorist and insurgent movements have also been largely anchored in nationalist and ethnic power bases even when they have sought to mobilise a transnational ideological appeal on religious or class grounds. There have been a few exceptions to this pattern such as the alliance between the German Baader-Meinhof group and the Japanese Red Army Faction, but even such international alliances as this did not, until at least the 1980s, presage anything like a global terrorist network necessitating a global strategic response. This study examines terrorism and global strategic responses.     

Setting a place at the table: ending insurgencies through the political process

This article argues that, under certain conditions, allowing insurgents into the political process – through elections or government posts – can be a useful tool in the peace process and can help end insurgencies. However, bringing insurgents into the political process is unlikely to end insurgencies on its own, particularly if insurgents, the government, or the population believes that force is still a viable means of defeating the opponent and changing the status quo. The article begins with a brief overview of the causes of insurgency and on conflict resolution for internal wars. The article then considers two examples of insurgents that have entered the political process – the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and Hezbollah in Lebanon – and the differing degrees of success in transforming these insurgents to non-violent participants in the political process. It concludes by suggesting how insurgents can be brought into the political process as part of conflict resolution and the implications for Afghanistan.     

汉语语境下教师对学生冲突性话语的回应策略与面子的语用分析

师生间的言语冲突在课堂教学中时有发生,而这一现象并未引起足够重视。课堂教学中师生间冲突性话语为本文的研究对象,分析其语言表现,并依据Brown&Levinson的面子威胁论,探析教师对于学生不合作话语引发的冲突回应,旨在揭示师生间冲突性话语的面子威胁性特征及语用理据。     

RAISING THE COST OF REBELLION: THE ROLE OF THIRD‐PARTY INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT

This paper presents a simple model to characterize explicitly the role that an intervening third party plays in raising the cost of rebellion in an intrastate conflict. Extending the Gershenson‐Grossman (2000 Gershenson, D. and Grossman, H.I. 2000. Civil conflict: ended or never ending?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 44(6): 807–821.  [Google Scholar]) framework of conflict in a two‐stage game to the case involving outside intervention in a three‐stage game as in Chang et al. (2007b Chang, Y.‐M., Potter, J. and Sanders, S. 2007b. War and peace: third‐party intervention in conflict. European Journal of Political Economy, 23(4): 954–974.  [Google Scholar]), we examine the conditions under which an outside party optimally intervenes such that (i) the strength of the rebel group is diminished or (ii) the rebellion is deterred altogether. We also find conditions in which a third party optimally intervenes but at a level insufficient to deter rebellion. Such behavior, which improves the incumbent government’s potential to succeed in conflict, is overlooked in some conflict studies evaluating the effectiveness of intervention. One policy implication of the model is that an increase in the strength of inter‐governmental trade partnerships increases the likelihood that third‐party intervention deters rebellion.     

Economic reconstruction amidst conflict: Insights from Afghanistan and Iraq

Economic reconstruction typically takes place after the end of war. Yet recently, economic reconstruction has been viewed as a means to ‘win hearts and minds’ during ongoing conflict. Drawing on a variety of reconstruction experiences from Afghanistan and Iraq, we identify four ‘reconstruction traps’ that result from the incentives and constraints faced by actors involved in economic reconstruction during ongoing conflict. These traps include: 1. the credible commitment trap, 2. the knowledge trap, 3. the political economy trap, and 4. the bureaucracy trap. Avoiding these traps is critical for successful economic reconstruction; and we discuss potential strategies for doing so.     

TANZANIA

Protracted state collapse in Somalia has led to a multiplication and diversification of armed groups. We can speak of at least five types of armed group: faction, warlord, business, court, and Islamic militias. These groups differ in important ways, yet often are simply classified as ‘militia’ or ‘warlord’. This essay seeks to add a measure of analytical rigour to the classification of armed groups and provides a comparison using a framework of purpose, motivations, logistics, and command, control and communication. It concludes with some observations about the importance of making these distinctions when formulating policy for this region.     

The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad factor in the Mali crisis

Mali has been a battleground for more than a year now. While the armed conflict came in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis that left the regional security environment depleted, it also served as a catalyst for the collapse of state authority in Mali. This created conditions conducive for the proliferation of, and attacks by, radical religious armed groups in the northern regions of the country, including the Tuareg armed movement: the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). But, far from being a new phenomenon, the Tuareg-led armed insurrection in the northern regions is as old as the post-colonial Malian state, and continues to pose tremendous challenges in West Africa and the Sahel region for both regional and extra-regional actors. The recent crisis in the Sahel region is seen as one of the most serious since the end of the Cold War, with anticipated dire long-term impacts on the security of the region and beyond. While attention is predominantly focused on defeating the jihadist groups that have threatened the survival of the Malian state, one must not lose sight of the fact that the ‘Tuareg Factor’, as represented by the rebellion launched by MNLA, remains critical both in terms of appreciating the deterioration of the situation and attempting to frame long-lasting solutions. The paper argues that the Tuareg's persistent recourse to rebellion against Bamako needs to be understood within a historical trajectory that takes into consideration three key parameters: firstly, the post-colonial state in Mali and its African leadership's relations with the descendants of the Tuareg communities; secondly, the amalgamation created by the so-called war on terror; and, finally, the contradictions of the democratisation process of the 1990s.¹1 This article is based on field research carried out between 2008 and 2013 on the ‘Resurgence of Tuareg-led Rebellions’.